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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY V. LAW, OR A
PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES
BY

WILBERT

E.

MOORE

T

HE topic of our conference is sufficiently broad to permit us lots
of room to move around, perhaps to lose ourselves. My mission
in these introductory comments is, to change the metaphor, to recognize
that we do have a broad canvas and to seize a large brush and paint
with broad strokes. This means that some of my statements are bound
to be cryptic.
The title of this brief discourse may stand accused of being too
cute, as I intend to explore interdependence as well as conflict. Yet
the prideful and sometimes insular quest for autonomy on the part of
representatives of major fields of learning lends some credibility to an
adversary proceeding.
The participants in this conference represent a broad cross section
of natural scientists, technologists, legal scholars, and social scientists
not elsewhere classified. That means that our communications will have
to be interdisciplinary if we communicate at all. Now, the glamor of
interdisciplinary work, so highly touted a decade or so ago, has been
dimmed by its difficulty. Yet, the problems that face our civilization
are notably undisciplined. Some cooperation is therefore essential if
we have any chance at all for sensible solutions. But that requires that
some highly disciplined men also become interdisciplinary; one might
almost say that the desirable strategy is to develop an intellectual
specialty to a high level and then outgrow it.
In introducing the discussion of the interrelations of science and
technology on the one hand and law on the other, I want to attend
first to a couple of what I shall pretentiously call grand themes and
then to a few minor and major themes, concluding with an attempt to
put some of this discussion in the context of my own primary discipline
of sociology.
I.

THE GRAND THEMES

The first theme that I wish to explore concerning the intersection
of science and law may be summarized as the view of science as
innovator and law as conservator, or put even less tenably, scientists
as perpetrators of problems and lawyers as perpetrators of solutions.
(Clearly, I do not refer here to the scientific quest for the lawful
character of nature and universe rather to the relation of that enterprise
to the formalized custom, conventions, and procedures by which
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societies attempt to maintain a modicum of social order.) For the view
of science and technology as innovative and law as conservative there
is considerable evidence and conventional wisdom, but the case is not
untainted.
(1) Technologists often, and sometimes properly, stand accused
of "tunnel vision," of pursuing narrow goals and solutions according
to decisions made by others without regard for real social need or
merit. For some inventions the proper response may be "Who needs
them ?" or even "Shouldn't we prevent them ?"

(2) Even in "pure science" the innovations may be relatively
minor. If we accept Thomas Kuhn's view of The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions,1 much of scientific work consists of filling-in paradigms
until the paradigms will no longer serve insistent observations. Thus
science may be more or less locked in by current presuppositions.
(3) The conservative influence of law may also be exaggerated.
Against the undoubted importance of precedent in court decisions we
should have to set the influence of legislation, administrative decision,
and even judicial decision as agencies for the achievement of legal
change.
The second theme to be explored is the view of science-technology
and of law as autonomous forces. Part of this view is the myth of
technical primacy. That technology always leads and other human
concerns tardily follow is a belief widely held, and one widely admired
by technologists for that makes them leaders. The view will not withstand close examination. Though essentially accidental discoveries do
occur, we mainly get the technology that we deserve or are willing to
pay for: moon shots and dirty rivers, two-car families and congested
cities. A perhaps stronger case can be made for the leading position of
science as such; but here too, we must note that there is an interaction
between science and technology, not a unidirectional flow from theory
to practice, and that science prospers or barely survives chiefly in terms
of levels of support from all sources. For some time now scientists and
technologists have proved themselves less immune to or innocent of
the political process than their traditional protestations of neutrality
would lead us to expect. It would be far too cynical to allege that the
participation of scientists in the many discussions of science and public
policy reflects chiefly an interest in research budgets, but that concern
is one effective way of losing political neutrality.
The autonomy of legal systems is also subject to reservation.
Despite the sense by the legal fraternity that they represent an ancient
and honorable tradition, that tradition is subject to both disuse and to
reflections in the law of our current state, including our current
1
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technical state. It is true that in the Roman law system (improperly
called the civil law system) there is a strong presumption that the
framers of the codes took care of all eventualities, but it is a presumption
conspicuously falsified by crucial issues in a changeful world. In the
common law system, judicial precedent (the doctrine of stare decisis)
is sometimes given similar credence as providing legal autonomy. But
decisions do change, albeit sometimes slowly, in large part because
the cases change as a consequence of changing social, scientific, and
technical circumstances. Indeed, if we take political and legislative
processes as part of the legal system, as I believe we must, the law
necessarily reflects the various pressures for amelioration and redress
of grievances as well as the changing balances of interests. But this
second theme was to doubt the autonomy of either science or the
law; we now rest the case.
II.

THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY AND THE

LAW: MINOR AND MAJOR THEMES.

In what immediately follows I am going to play the part of the
amateur lawyer, for as a law professor I am licensed to practice in no
known jurisdiction except possibly in the south basement of the University of Denver College of Law. In doing so I should like to note
briefly some substantive areas in law that conspicuously intersect with
technical and scientific concerns. Perhaps the most obvious of these is
the law of patents, a legal specialty long recognized by the legal
profession which has long pretended that it generally did not specialize.
The patent attorney, working with an inventor or with a technical team,
must determine whether the innovation in product or process is both
sufficiently novel and useful. As I understand patent law, some color
of utility must be claimed, and that could scarcely be determined on
legal grounds alone. A technical and even possibly a social input would
seem indicated.
Another clear-cut intersection of law and technology is that of
natural resources law. The legal interest is clear in real property law
and in such rights as arise in irrigation networks. But further, the
question of what constitutes natural resources also prominently involves
the current state of the useful arts, that is, technology.
Still another area of intersection is represented in traffic control.
The rules of the road are mainly represented in a host of administrative
regulations, and not a few of those are implemented technically, ranging
from safety inspections and radar traps for speeders to possible electronic controls for the spacing of vehicles on streets and highways. The
current scandal of automobile liability insurance and the overburdening
of the courts and the legal fraternity by automobile negligence (tort
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liability) cases are inviting institutional remedies such as no-fault
insurance, yet the proximate cause of this grave problem is the automobile accident, and accident prevention would seem to require a
combination of legal and technical innovations.
As a final substantive area of law for present illustrative purposes,
there is that somewhat abstruse - some would say nonexistent - legal
specialty identified as international law, including such clearly technical
fields as nuclear limitation, space law, and exploitation of the sea. To
keep science and technology national is virtually impossible, despite
security regulations and what I call the gauze of secrecy. This is partly
because scientists and technologists identify professionally and communicate with their fellow specialists. But, more importantly, similar
people working on similar problems will probably reach similar conclusions. Yet, if science and technology are predominantly international
- and they do indeed form part of a global system - law is not. Law
is predominantly territorial or jurisdictional, and that presents problems
for the legal control of scientific and technical innovation. Since we now
have a variety of ways of destroying the world for human habitation,
it would seem that some legal and technical ingenuity might be devoted
to saving it.
I next turn to a brief review of legal procedures for intersecting
with science and technology. The predominant one, of course, is that
of legislation and its creatures: the funding, research, and administrative
agencies. One need only note by example the National Science Foundation, the Office of Science and Technology, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, or the Federal Aviation Administration to call to mind
many others that rely on technical information and advice for carrying
out their missions. Some of these promote and some of them administer
and control, but the difference is not sharp, since the power to promote
is in effect the power to control.
Even the judicial process is of course not impervious to technical
information. One well-established procedure, though not exactly common, is the amicus curiae brief that presumes to inform the court on
matters relevant to a judicial decision. The appellate judges may take
"judicial notice" of such amicus briefs in rendering decisions.
A currently very lively but still controversial procedure is the "class
action" suit, perhaps most conspicuously associated in the public consciousness with "Nader's Raiders" (who have instituted few such
suits). Recent attempts to represent purchasers of allegedly inferior
or unsafe products, or citizens suffering from air pollution are examples
of such suits. Even esthetic suffering may provide a cause of action, as
it already does in zoning regulations. The problem of "bounding the
class" one supposes is mainly a legal and sociological problem; but,
testimony on the mischief complained of is mainly a technical one.
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Before concluding the discussion of the intersection of law and
technology, I should like to refer briefly to law itself as a kind of social
technology practiced by professionals at varying degrees of proficiency
as well as by a variety of paraprofessionals, some of whom are
comparable to technical assistants. Whether law is also a social science
has excited animated debate in more than one conference, and I doubt
that it would be useful here to debate it again. However, I do have a
comment to make. One view contrary to the acceptance of law as a
social science points to the supposed contrast between the inquiring
mind of the scientist and the adversary or the litigious mind of the
lawyer. Yet when I observe the disputes among scientists, I am not
totally persuaded of the validity of the contrast.
III.

GRAND THEMES REVISTED

It would not do for a sociologist, who is supposed to be able to
relate anything to anything, to conclude without a small conceptual
exercise and a tiny view of sociological theory. Hence, I shall characterize briefly four sociological views of the social order.
Functionalism, which dominated sociological theory for a considerable time, might be succinctly summarized as the view that everything is related to everything. It was predominantly a static view of the
social universe and methodologically meant that the selection of independent and dependent variables could be nearly arbitrary.
Neofunctionalism might be summarized as the view "but some
things are more related than others," e.g., that economy, education, or
technology predict more similarities and variations in behavior than
religion or even law.
Dynamism, a clear outgrowth of neofunctionalism, attended to
intrinsic sources of change in systems, although it often operated on
mindlessly mechanical models, such as the social evolutional doctrine or
the doctrine of technological primacy (as though machines were selfinventing without the intervention of human skill and purpose). Yet,
more complex models of change do attend to unequal rates, to genuine
sequences, and to interplay among elements in the dynamic process.
Here again, I should reiterate that science and technology may be
lagging, not leading.
Neodynamism (a regrettable term used only for symmetry) argues
that we can alter the course of events by deliberate action, both in terms
of goals and, to a more limited extent, in terms of means and sequences.
Neither science-technology nor law is indeed autonomous and independent of human will and wisdom. Each is subject to human purpose.
In closing, I cannot refrain from quoting a quatrain from Fitz-
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gerald's first translated version of a portion of the Rubaiyat of Omar
Khayyam.2
Ah love. Could thou and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits - and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's Desire?

2 RUBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM (ist ed. E. Fitzgerald transl. 1967).

